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Abstract
Ms. Mota is a professor of legal studies at Bowling Green State University. She obtained her
J.D. from The University of Toledo College of Law and her M.A. and B.A. from Bowling Green
State University. Below, Ms. Mota briefly outlines recent litigation concerning the unaccredited
copying of an uncopyrighted work, and provides a critical analysis of the ethical dilemma arising
out of Dastar.
In its 2003 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two copyright-related cases. The first, Eldred
v. Reno, upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act. The second, Dastar
v. Twentieth Century Fox, may have received less publicity, but is nonetheless an important case,
both from academic and practical viewpoints. This case held that the Lanham Act does not
prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work. From an academic viewpoint, this
poses an interesting ethical dilemma - although the copying was deemed legal, it is probably
neither ethical nor a good business strategy. If a student did the same thing, it could even be
considered plagiarism. From a practical viewpoint, the original owner must maintain copyright
protection for the whole statutory period, which has been extended under the Copyright Term
Extension Act. Thus, this article examines the unanimous decision by the Court in Dastar.
DASTAR v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX-ONE CAN’T GET BACK BY
TRADEMARK WHAT ONE GAVE UP UNDER COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2003 Sue Mota
I.

Introduction

On June 2, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court released the second decision of its 2003 term
concerning copyright.

The first, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 1 upheld the constitutionality of the

Copyright Term Extension Act. 2 The second, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, 3 held that the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an
uncopyrighted work. 4 This author agrees with the Dastar decision because to hold otherwise,

1

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). See generally Sue Ann Mota, “For Limited Times”: The Supreme Court
Finds the Copyright Team Extension Act Constitutional in Eldred v. Ashcroft, But When Does It End?” intell. prop.
& tech. f. (forthcoming); Sue Ann Mota, Eldred v. Reno – Is the Copyright Term Extension Act Constitutional?, 12
alb. l.j. sci. & tech. 167 (2001).
2
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 302-305 (2000).
3
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
4
Id. at 2049.
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would allow contravention of the Constitutional requirement for “limited times” for copyrights.
However, this decision allows Dastar to get away with legal corporate plagiarism.
In the section below, this article will contrast the Constitutional underpinning for
copyright and trademark law, as well as what is covered by copyright and trademark law, and the
terms for each. Next, a closer examination of the Dastar case and its ramifications will be
explored, as well as a very simple solution to this problem—the maintenance of copyright
protection, especially since the term extension has been recently upheld. 5 Finally, this article
will examine the ethical implications of the Dastar case.
II.

Copyright v. Trademark Law

According to the Constitution, “The Congress shall have power to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
rights to their respective writings and discoveries.” 6 From this clause, Congress has the power to
enact copyright and patent law. The Framers of the Constitution seem to have been unanimous
on this clause; the final form was adopted without debate. 7

Copyright protection exists in

original works of authorship fixed in any tangible form which includes: “literary works; musical
works, including accompanying words; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; and architectural works.” 8 The copyright term in the United States is currently the
author’s life plus seventy years. 9 The term for anonymous, pseudonymous, or works made for

5

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [A] (2003) (citing MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 at 512-13 (1920) (Hunt and Scott ed. 1920)).
8
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
9
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
6
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hire is currently ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation,
whichever comes first. 10
Trademark law is enacted under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 11 which gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states. When
Congress initially attempted to enact trademark law under the above mentioned clause, giving
itself the power to grant authors and inventors the exclusive rights for limited times, 12 the U.S.
Supreme Court in The Trademark Cases 13 refused this authority. 14 The current trademark law,
the Lanham Act, protects “any word, name, symbol, or device, or combination” used to identify
and distinguish goods from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods. 15 The Lanham Act goes beyond such traditional trademark protection and creates a
federal remedy against one who uses in commerce either a false designation of origin or any
false description or representation in connection with any goods or services. 16
Since trademark law is enacted under the Commerce Clause and is not subject to the
Constitutional “limited times” language, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office allows a
trademark holder to renew the mark for repeated periods of ten years. 17 The mark, however, may

10

Id. at § 302(c). This is an extension by the Copyright Term Extension Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 302-303 (Supp. V
1999). The prior U.S. copyright term was 20 years less. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). This extension, including its
retroactive aspects, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The old US
term was in accordance with the WTO’s Agreement on Trade Relations of Intellectual Property Rights. Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (Apr. 15, 1994).
11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
14
Id. at 96-97.
15
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). A service mark is similarly defined as any word, name, symbol or device, or
combination to identify and distinguish the services of one person from services of others and to indicate the source
of the services. Id.
16
Id.
17
15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2000).
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not be intentionally abandoned or become generic. 18

Thus, copyright and trademark have

differing Constitutional underpinnings and terms. While aspects of the same item may be
covered by both copyright and patent protection, the Court in Dastar had to decide whether
trademark law would take over when copyright law had expired.
III.

Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox

In 1948, Doubleday copyrighted and published General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s book,
Crusade in Europe, which was about the allied campaign in Europe during World War II.
Doubleday granted exclusive television rights to an affiliate of Twentieth Century Fox, and Fox
arranged for Times, Inc. to produce a television series based on the copyrighted book. The
television series, also called Crusade in Europe, was first broadcasted in 1949 with twenty-six
episodes. Fox held the copyright. 19 Furthermore, in 1975, Doubleday renewed the copyright on
the book, Crusade in Europe, but Fox did not renew the copyright on the television series,
Crusade in Europe. The copyright on the television series expired in 1977, and the series entered
the public domain. 20 In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights in the book, 21 but obviously
not the copyright, which was lost when the television series entered the public domain.
In 1995, Dastar expanded its product line from music CDs to videos. For the upcoming
fiftieth anniversary of World War II’s end, Dastar edited the Crusade in Europe television series,

18

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2044.
20
Id.
21
Id. SFM Entertainment and New Line Home Video, Inc., plaintiffs in the original suit, obtained the exclusion
rights to re-release the Crusade in Europe series on video from Fox. Id.
19
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added some new material, and released a video set called World War II Campaign in Europe
without attribution. 22
In 1998, Twentieth Century Fox and others 23 filed suit claiming that Dastar violated the
copyright of the book Crusade in Europe and also infringed on the plaintiff’s exclusive rights to
reproduce and distribute videos based on the book. 24 Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants
engaged in reverse passing off under the Lanham Act 25 and California’s unfair competition law
by misappropriating the Crusade in Europe television series and by falsely identifying
themselves as the producers of the series. 26 Defendants counterclaimed for intentional and
negligent misrepresentation, slander of title, and unfair competition. All counterclaims were
eventually dismissed. 27

22

Id. Dastar purchased tapes of the original television series, which were in the public domain. The original series
was edited; the new series is just over half as long but with a new opening sequence, credit page, and final closing.
Dastar sold the video set as its own product without reference to the original television series. The new series was
sold at Sam’s Club, Costco, and Best Buy, among others, at $25 per set, substantially less than what the original
series sold for. Id.
23
See supra note 21.
24
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-7189, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22064 (C.D. Cal.
Nov.28, 2000).
25
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000), which states in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
or origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which –
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Passing off or palming off occurs when one misrepresents goods as someone else’s; reverse passing off is when
one represents someone else’s as one’s own. Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2044 n.1.
26
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., No. 98-7189, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22064, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 28, 2000).
27
Id.
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In January 2000, the district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
on the three claims. 28 A three-day bench trial was held on remedies. The district court granted
the maximum amount of statutory damages plus injunctive relief under the Copyright Act. 29 In
addition, the district court awarded plaintiffs double the profits from the re-released video for
reverse passing off under the Lanham Act in order to deter future conduct, and issued a
permanent injunction. 30 In addition, the district court awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to the
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. 31
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion in 2002,
affirmed in part. 32 Since Dastar copied, to a large extent, the entire Crusade in Europe television
series, Dastar committed a “bodily appropriation” of this series. Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the summary judgment on reverse passing off under the Lanham Act. 33 The court also
affirmed the district court’s ruling on profits under the Lanham Act because the trademark
infringement was “deliberate and willful,” credits to the original series were not included, and
Dastar continued to market the series even after being informed of the possible trademark
violation. 34 According to the appellate court, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

28

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *3. One hundred fifty thousand dollars was awarded on this claim. Id.
30
Id. Over one million five hundred thousand dollars was awarded under this claim. Id.
31
Id. at *3-4. Nearly one million five hundred thousand dollars in attorneys’ fees were awarded. Id. The court
considered the defendants’ bad faith motivation, which was apparent from the aggressive litigation tactics of their
attorneys, in their award. Id. at *5. The defendants’ aggressive litigation tactics, such as filing motions and other
pages which violated local rules and court orders, filing frivolous pleadings and motions, and obstructing discovery,
also drove up the costs of litigation and consequently the size of the award of attorneys’ fees. Id. at *17-18. The
court also cited defendants’ litigation abuses such as both filing motions late and early. Id. at *12.
32
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp, 34 Fed. Appx. 312 (9th Cir. 2002). See generally Brandi A.
Karl, Note, Reverse Passing Off and Database Protections: Daystar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 9
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. l. 481 (2003).
33
Id. at 314. The minimal changes were insufficient to avoid liability. Id.
34
Id. at 315.
29
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doubling the profits under the Lanham Act. 35 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that
the damages duplicate the statutory damages under the Copyright Act. 36

The copyright

infringement claim was remanded for trial. Since the attorneys’ fees were awarded in part based
on the copyright claim, these too were remanded for recalculation after the copyright claim was
resolved.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 37 In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia in
which Justice Breyer took no part, the U.S. Supreme Court held on June 2, 2003, that the
Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work, thus reversing
the appellate court and remanding the case. 38 According to the Court, the Lanham Act “was
intended to make ‘actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks,’ and ‘to protect persons
engaged in ... commerce against unfair competition.’” 39

One section of the Lanham Act,

however, extends traditional trademark protection and creates a federal remedy against one “who
use[s] in commerce either ‘a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation’ in connection with ‘any goods or services.’” 40 The court stated that it must
decide what the origin of goods means under the Lanham Act. 41

35

Id.
Id. at 315-16.
37
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), cert. granted.
38
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2043. See generally Amicus Brief, Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law
Professors in Support of Dastar Corp., 24 whittier l. rev. 931(2003).
39
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2045 (citing 15 USC §1127 (2000)).
40
Id. at 2043 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1125 (2000)). As originally enacted and after the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988, this section does not have boundless application, and can never be a federal codification of the overall law of
unfair competition. Id.
41
Id. at 2046-47. “Origin” goes beyond geographic origin to origin of source or manufacture, creating a federal
cause of action for traditional trademark infringement even for unregistered marks. Id. at 2046. In addition, every
circuit which considered the issue held that the Lanham Act protected against reverse passing off. Id. See supra
note 25 for a definition of reverse passing off.
36
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The definition of “origin” is essential to determine whether Dastar made a false
designation of origin in violation of the Lanham Act. If Dastar merely repackages the television
series as videos, then Dastar violated the Lanham Act. If Dastar took a work in the public
domain, copied it, modified it, and produced its own series, then Dastar is not liable. In other
words, according to the Court, if origin refers only to the manufacturer or producer of the actual
product, then Dastar is the origin, but if origin includes the creator of the underlying work, then
someone else is the origin. 42
The court examined the Webster’s New International Dictionary definition of “origin,”
which is the “fact or process of coming into being from a source.”43 The court thought that the
most natural understanding of origin of goods is the producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace, which is Dastar. 44 The Court concluded that “reading the phrase ‘origin of goods’
in accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations…and in light of the copyright and patent
laws,” that “origin” refers to “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not
to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” 45 Thus, Dastar
was the origin of the goods, and the Lanham Act claim against them cannot prevail. 46
In the Court’s view, “origin of goods” does not connote the person or entity that goods
“embody or contain.” 47 To give special treatment to communication products, which have value
for the intellectual content instead of the physical characteristics, would cause the Lanham Act to

42

Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2047.
Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1720-21 (1949)).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 2049. The common law foundation of the Lanham Act did not protect originality or creativity; the copyright
and patent laws were intended to protect creativity. Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 2047. An extension beyond this would stretch the text, go beyond the history and purpose of the Lanham
Act, and be inconsistent with precedent. Id. The Lanham Act prohibits actions which deceive and impair a
producer’s goodwill. Id. The Lanham Act should not go beyond this to cover matters which are typically of no
consequence to consumers. Id.
43
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conflict with the Copyright Act. 48 Once a patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the work
passes into the public domain, 49 thus the encouragement to innovate is balanced against the
public’s right in those works.
There are problems if the term “origin” were further extended. When Congress chose to
extend the right of attribution, it did so carefully and deliberately in the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990, 50 unlike the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of origin. 51 Furthermore, giving “origin” a
broader meaning under the Lanham Act would pose further practical problems, such as
determining the outer limit of “origin.” 52 Manufacturers would be in a lose-lose situation; they
could be liable either for crediting a work or for not crediting a work. 53 In other words, if the
Court had expanded the definition of “origin,” a company like Dastar could be liable if the
original creator was not credited. Additionally, there could also be a Lanham Act violation if the
creator were credited and there was a subsequent Lanham Act suit for false designation of origin
since the original creator did not assent to the repackaging. Thus, the Court did not create a
Lanham Act cause of action for “plagiarism.” 54

48

Id. at 2048.
Id.
50
17 U.S.C. § 106A (d)(1) (2000).
51
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2048-49.
52
Id. at 2049.
53
Id.
54
Id. At the time of this writing, three other courts have cited Dastar. One district court granted a motion to dismiss
one count with leave to amend, and a motion to dismiss a second count, based on Dastar. Boston In’l Music, Inc. v.
Austin, No. 02-12148-GAO, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003). In this case, the
plaintiffs claim that the defendants copied distinctive portions of a musical composition without permission. The
first count was dismissed with leave to amend because the plaintiffs did not allege that they were the owners or the
exclusive licensees of the composition, under copyright law. The second count, under trademark law, was dismissed
as it is sufficiently covered under copyright. Id. A second district court granted a motion for reconsideration,
considering Dastar. Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., No. 98-C0287, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13224 (N.D.
Ill. July 28, 2003). A third district court cited Dastar in a decision not intended for publication in print. Eco Mfg. v.
Honeywell Int’l, No. 1:03-cv-0170-DFH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11384 (S.D. Ind. June 20, 2003).
49
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IV.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox did not allow Fox to recover
under trademark law what was voluntarily relinquished under the Lanham Act. 55 The very
simple solution to this problem is to maintain copyright for the full statutory period. This period
has been extended retroactively for an additional twenty years, and now lasts for either the
author’s life plus seventy years, ninety-five years from publication, or one hundred twenty years
from creation, whichever comes first for pseudonymous, anonymous, or works made for hire. 56
In this sense, this author supports the Court’s conclusion.
In another sense, this author also supports the Court’s conclusion. The Constitution
allows Congress to enact laws to grant copyright protection for limited times. 57 To extend
protection beyond those limited times by getting through trademark what is unavailable through
copyright, or allow to expire under copyright as in Dastar, would circumvent this Constitutional
requirement.
A very interesting ethical dilemma arises from this case, which supports the statement
that things deemed ethical are not always legal, and vice versa. Dastar, a company that acted
aggressively in litigation 58 and used another’s work without attribution, is not liable under the
Lanham Act or under copyright law, since the copyright lapsed. In contrast, if a college student
used another’s work without attribution in a research paper, this would be considered plagiarism
under university codes and handbooks. Inevitably, this double standard sends the conflicting
message that corporations are legally entitled to do what college students are prohibited from

55

See supra note 3.
See supra notes 1 and 3.
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58
See supra note 33.
56
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doing under academic codes. Nevertheless, the Dastar result is due in large part because Fox did
not maintain the copyright in the television series. As the Court stated, “[t]he creative talent of
the sort that lay behind the campaign’s videos is not left with protection.” 59
From a business viewpoint, one may want to give attribution to a communicative project,
which is in the public domain. This may make the new product even more valuable, so long as
no intellectual property under protection is taken. In conclusion, Dastar has seemingly gotten
away with what could be considered plagiarism in the academic setting, because copyrights were
not maintained in otherwise protected works. In other words, users of a work are always free to
grant attribution where credit is due, even if credit is not due legally.

59

Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2049.
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